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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, } 
Plaintiff-Hc.\'(0;1dc11t. ( 
·. Case No. 
vs, I 11038 
TONY RENZO ~ ~cf end a 11l-i•pp:ftu11 I ' 
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Tony Renzo, appeals from a con-
riction of the crime of manslaughter in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-5 ( 1953), on trial by jury 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah the Honorable Brvant H. Croft pre-, . 
siding. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,i\TER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with 
the crime of murder in the first degree. A jury trial 
was held on June 12-15, 1967. The jury returned a 
verdict on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter 
and the Honorable Bryant H. Croft imposed sentence 
on the appellant of confinement in the Utah State Prison 
for the indeterminate term as provided by law of not 
less than one nor more than ten years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Third District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the follow-
ing evidence of facts as being more in keeping with the 
rule that evidence will be reviewed on appeal in a light 
most favorable to the verdict below. 
In the early morning of February 28, 1965, Salt 
Lake City Police officers were called to a local residence 
to investigate the death of one Bertha Magera (R. 150). 
The residence was strewn with pieces of human flesh 
(R.259), human hair was found in several rooms (R. 
262) , and there were large areas of dried human blood 
in the bedroom where the deceased was discovered and 
in the kitchen (R.171). 
2 
Evidence was adduced showing that appellant and 
deceased had been seeing one another for several months 
preYious, and that appellant had a vicious temper and 
occasionally resorted to physical punishment of the de-
ceased ( R.470) . 
On the evening of February 27, 1965, appellant 
and one Clarence 'iVilliams entered the deceased's home 
and remained there for some three to four hours ( R. 
334). All three were drinking when appellant began 
to attack Mr. Williams, hitting him in the face and 
kicking him while Williams lay on the kitchen fbor 
close to unconsciousness ( R.337). 
\Vhile on the floor Williams heard an argument 
between deceased and appellant, then felt Bertha's body 
striking his and appellant saying "If you want her 
you can have her." (R.338). When Williams regained 
consciousness, both appellant and deceased had left the 
kitchen area but could be heard arguing in another 
portion of the residence ( R.339). 
Appellant then returned to the kitchen area and 
began mopping up the blood which had spilled on the 
floor ( R.339) . 
Appellant and 'iVilliams then left the residence 
with appellant returning early the next morning (R. 
363). Two women friends of appellant entered the 
residence at that time and discovered the nude body 
of the deceased on a bed in the bedroom. Appellant was 
recp1ested to remain, but refused to do so and struck 
3 
one of the women as she attempted to restrain him 
(R.367). 
Police officers took appellant into custody and 
found his clothing and shoes coYered with reddish brow 11 
stains which appeared to be blood (R397). 
An autopsy was performed on the deceased which 
revealed multiple bruises covering the face, arms, 
trunk, buttocks, and legs; several tears in the wall of 
the vagina, and multiple fracturing of the ribs with 
one of the fractured ribs puncturing the right lung 
(T.221-227). The vaginal tearing could have been 
caused by a bamboo stick, (state's exhibit No. 38), 
found in the deceased's home with what appeared to 
blood on it ( T .180, 224) . The primary cause of death 
was respiratory failure due to the fracture of the chest 
wall and the resultant inability of the chest wall to 
move with respiration, together with the collapsed lung 
(T.228). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT SUFFERED NO DENIAL 
OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. 
Appellant would have this court view the time from 
the filing of the complaint against him in February. 
1965, until his trial in June, 1967, as a legal continuun1 
which, providing there was no waiver of speedy trial b) 
4 
appellant, would constitute a twenty-seven month delay 
that could raise serious constitutional questions of speedy 
trial. 
Hespondent submits, however, that this is not a 
proper view of the circumstances presented by appel-
lant's case. Insofar as the events of 1965 are concerned 
' 
as those proceedings stood at dismissal, the threshold 
of the constitutional speedy trial guarantee had not 
yet been reached. The dismissal, coming at the end of 
preliminary hearing, stopped the process short of bind-
ing appellant over for trial. 
The rule is firmly established that the protection 
of speedy trial afforded by the Sixth Amendment has 
no application until after a prosecution is instituted. 
Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1961), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 888, 82 Sup. Ct. 139, 7 L.Ed.2d 
88 ( 1961), also holding that prosecution is not insti-
tuted until an indictment is returned or an information 
is filed. 
The guarantee of speedy trial does not apply from 
the time of arrest to the time defendant is bound over 
for trial. State v. Enriquez, 102 Ariz. 4<02, 430 P.2d 
~22 (1967). 
Guarantee of speedy trial does not apply to pre-
iiminary hearing, but rather, to trial held after in<lict-
ment is returned or information filed, and at which the 
issue of guilt or innocence is to be determined. Sta! c 
l'. Lee, 197 Kan. 463, 419 P.2d 927 ( 1966). 
5 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8 ( 6) ( 1953) , which this 
court has held in State v. Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d ~01, 1 
418 P.2d 134 (1966), to be the statutory implementa-
tion of federal and state constitutional guarantees to 
speedy trial, speaks only of expediting the proceedings 
after arraignment. 
Respondent submits, therefore, that since the 1965 
proceedings were dismissed after preliminary inquiry, 
the appellant not being bound over for trial, charged by 
information, or arraigned, the constitutional rights to 
speedy trial were not applicable at the stage of the pro-
ceedings at which dismissal was granted. That right 
did not attach until appellant was bound over for trial 
and was charged by information in April, 1967, and 
thus, it cannot be said he was denied a speedy trial. 
If this court determines that the constitutional 
speedy trial protections were applicable to the 1965 pro-
ceedings, they were satisfied by the dismissal occurring 
slightly over a month from the time of arrest and had 
no application to appellant from that time until the 
subsequent institution of proceedings. The facts pre· 
sented demonstrate two distinct legal proceedings. 
Respondent submits that the proper scope of appli· 1 
cability of the constitutional speedy trial protections, 
and its out~r limits in such cases, is illustrated by the 
recent United States Supreme Court decision in 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), which 
is clearly distinguishable from the case on appeal. There, 
the Court was faced with a peculiar procedural device 
6 
allowing the prosecution to enter a "nolle prosequi wid1 
leave" which permitted the solicitor to reinstate the case 
at any time without further court order. Its entry tolled 
the statute of limitations as well, and thus subjected 
a defendant to an unlimited pendency in which the state 
could proceed at will without the necessity of a further 
showing of probable cause. In holding this to be viola-
tive of the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to speedy 
trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court concluded that such indefinite pendency might 
subject the petitioner to public scorn, loss of employ-
ment, and indefinitely continue the anxiety accompany-
ing public accusation. 
Appellant, on the other hand, after a complete 
dismissal, !'toad in society as completely absolved; one 
against whom not even probable cause had been found. 
The statute of limitations was not tolled. A showing 
of probable cause still had to be made to bring him 
within the judicial process. He had, in fact, not been 
prejudiced. 
Respondent submits that the decision of the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals in the case of United 
States v. Young, 237 A.2d 542 ( 1968), on which appel-
lant relies, wrongly equates the situation in that case 
(a dismissal and the later institution of like proceed-
ings) with the practice condemned in Klopf er v. North 
Carolina, supra. The decision reached in State v. Acker-
man, 27 Conn. Supp. 209, 234 A.2d 120 (1967), is 
more nearly within the rationale of the Klopfer case. 
7 
There it was held that a nolle prosequi, when uncondi-
tionally entered, was a dismissal; and as no conviction 
could be had except by beginning a new case agai11st 
defendant. There was no case pending against him, 
and the right to speedy trial was not denied def endaut 
when a new complaint was filed fifteen months later 
under either the Sixth Amendment or the state con-
stitutional guarantee. 
Assuming the extension of the Klopfer case in 
United States v. Young, supra, to be viable, this case 
is clearly distinguishable. First the defendant was 
charged by information prior to the dismissal of the 
first proceeding while appellant was not; and thus, 
as has been previously demonstrated, the threshold of 
the speedy trial guarantee was reached in that case, but 
was not reached in the instant case. Second, the court 
there found prosecution had been deliberately delayed, 
which from the record, cannot be said of the present case. 
As for the claimed prejudice resulting to defendant, 
the state cannot be charged with it under these circum-
stances, just as it cannot be charged with any prejudice 
that may result prior to the institution of proceedings, 
absent a showing of deliberate delay to gain prosecu· 
torial advantage. United States v. Harbin, 377 F.2d 
78 (9th Cir. 1967). 
The record here does not show such deliberate 
delay, and such showing cannot be made by unsuprorte<l 
allegations of appellant. As the speedy trial guarantee 
was not applicable to appellant in the 1965 proceedingi, 
8 
it was not applicable to him in the intervening time 
until institution of proceedings some months later. If 
it were applicable to him in 1965, it was satisfied by the 
dismissal; thus, again, was not applicable to him in the 
intervening time. 
While defendants have a constitutional right to 
speedy trial, they have no right to a prosecution speedier 
than that laid down by the statute of limitations. People 
v. Douglas, 54 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1967), citing People v. 
Jordan, 45 Cal.2d 697, 290 P.2d 484 (1955); People 
v. Ciavarella, 44 Misc.2d 792, 255 N.Y.S.2d 108 ( 1964). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 29 
AND 34 AS THEY WENT TO PROVING THE 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 
CHARGED, WERE RELEVANT, PROBA-
TIVE, AND WERE NOT INTRODUCED TO 
INFLAME THE JURY. 
Appellant contends that the admission into evidence 
1 of state's exhibit Nos. 29 and 34 was error. The exhibits 
consisted of two colored slides, both of the body of the 
decedent in the position and condition it was found 
at the scene of the crime. Exhibit 29, a photo taken 
from the foot of the bed on which the body was dis-
coyered, demonstrated the bruises on the legs and dam-
age to the vaginal area. Exhibit 34 was a photo dem-
9 
onstrating the damage to the vagina, with that organ 1 
distended by the examining physician's fingers. 
The admissibility of photographs is a matter uf 
judicial discretion and will not be disturbed unless it 
amounts to an abuse of discretion. State v. .J enscn 
' 
209 Ore. 239, 296 P.2d 618 (1956), People v. Schicrs, 
160 Cal. App.2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 ( 1968), 1llarti11c.:; 
v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951). 
On the subject of admission of such evidence, the 
Oregon State Supreme Court has stated in State v. 
Jensen, supra, at 296 P.2d 634-35: 
These lalleged errors] relate to the admission 
in evidence of so-called 'gruesome' exhibits over 
defendant's objections. They consist of photo· 
graphs of the body of the victim of the homicide 1 
... It is too late today to contend that in a capital 
case evidence which might shock the sensibilities 
of jurors is for that reason inadmissible .... 
Counsel for defendant does not so contend, but 
argues that the exhibits were irrelevant. Of 
course, to bring into the case wholly irrelevant 
evidence of a gruesome character merely for the 
purpose of exciting feelings of hate on the part 
of the jury against the defendant would be in-
defensible and intolerable. On the other hand, 
the prosecution, with its burden of establishing 
guilt -beyond a reasonable doubt, is not to be 
denied the right to prove eYer>' essential element 
of the crime by the most conyincing evidence it 
is able to produce. No one would be heard to 
object to testimony which does no more th.an 
faithfully describe the wounds which were ni-
flicted upon the Yictim of a homicide, no matter 
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how horrifying the narration might be. But a 
photograph of the corpse may fortify the oral 
testimony. Should it be excluded because it is, 
perhaps, even more revolting? ':Ve think not, 
as long as the defendant stands upon his plea 
of not guilty and the burden remains with the 
state of proving that the victim met death by the 
criminal agency alleged in the indictment. 
In these matters much is to be left to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge. The test is not whether 
the case might have been fully proved. without 
the evidence objected to, but whether such eYi-
dence tends to establish the truth of the charge. 
The state here had the burden of proving appellant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged, 
that of first degree murder. To do so, it necessarily had 
to prove the elements of that crime; enumerated in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-30-3 ( 1953), which in part provides: 
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in 
wait or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, mali-
cious and premeditated killing; or committed in 
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any 
arson, rape, burglary or robbery; or perpetrated 
from a premeditated design unlawfully and mali-
ciously to effect the death of any human being 
other than the one who is killed; or perpetrated 
by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others 
and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of 
human life ;-is murder in the first degree. . . . 
Further, the entire entry of a plea of not guiltr 
puts in issue every material allegation of the informa-
tion. Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-4 ( 1953). 
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Colored slides of the deceased were held properly 
admitted for their probative value in demonstratiu~ 
malice aforethought, and whether defendant had an 
abandoned and malignant heart at the time of the kill. I 
ing and there admissibility, was not an abuse of dis- j 
cretion even though they were gruesome. People r. 
1 
Taylor, 11 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1961). 
In answer to a defendant's contention that photos 
of the body of deceased on the bed where she was found, 
and autopsy pictures taken later should have been ex-
cluded, the court in People v. 1'oth, 6 Cal. Rptr. 372 
( 1960) , replied: 
In the trial of a charge of murder in the second 
degree it is essential for the People to establish 
malice aforethought. Such malice may be shown 
by the extent and severity of the injuries inflicted 
upon the victim and by the condition in which 
the victim was left by her attacker. 
Such photos have also been held admissible: To 
show the condition of the body, or to indicate the nature I 
or extent of wounds or injuries thereon, Reizenstien 
1 
v. State, 165 Neb. 865, 87 N.,¥.2d 560 (1958), manner ! 
of death, location, severity, and number of wounds, I 
I 
State v. Eubanks, 240 La. 552, 124 So.2d 543 (1966), I 
amount of force used, People v. Kolep, 29 Ill.2d 1160, I 
193 N.E. 2d 753 (1963), and the severity and violence 1 
of the assault on the deceased, Commonwealth v. Ray· 
mond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 ( 1963) ; the fact that 
such photos may be gruesome notwithstanding. 
12 
In a very recent Idaho murder case, the defendant 
was charged with murdering a three year old child by 
kicking it to death. The court there held that the charge 
involved the element of malice with which the crime 
was committed and photographs showing the battered 
nude body of the deceased helped to establish the malice. 
State v. Martinez, .... Idaho .... , 439 P.2d .... (April 15, 
1968). 
The court, in rejecting defendant's claim that these 
photographs had no probative value and served only 
to arouse the passions of the jury, stated at 439 P.2d ·---: 
The general rule is that photographs of the 
victim in a prosecution for homicide, duly veri-
fied and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful 
representations of the victim at the time in ques-
tion are, in the discretion of the trial court, ad-
missible in evidence as an aid to the jury in 
arriving at a fair understanding of the evidence, 
proof of the corpus delicti, extent of injury, con-
dition and identification of the body, or for their 
bearing on the question of the degree or atro-
ciousness of the crime, even though such photo-
graphs may have the additional effect of tending 
to excite the emotions of the jury. (See generally 
23 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 852[1] [1961]; 
29 Am. J ur.2d Evidence Secs. 785-788 and 798 
[1967]; 159 A.L.R 1413 [1945}. 73 A.L.R.2d 
769 [1960l. See also State v. Kleier, 69 Idaho 
Idaho 278, 206 P.2d 513 [1949}.) 
The generalizations above referred to have 
been specifically applied with respect to homicide 
cases involving the admissibility into evidence 
of photographs for the designated purpose of 
13 
determining the atrociousness or malice with 
which the crime was committed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellant was not denied 
the right to speedy trial and that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits com-
plained of. The court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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